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I. INTRODUCTION
Across the country, state legislatures have enacted criminal statutes with
crime victims in mind. The federal government led the way with the Victim
and Witness Protection Act (VWPA).I Before the promulgation of these laws,
many victims believed, and sometimes rightly so, that they had been
victimized and abused not only by the criminal defendants but by the criminal
justice system as well. Victims had no avenue through which to voice their
concerns in criminal matters that would forever affect their lives.
In most instances, victim protection laws have been reactive-responding
to the ever-increasing voices of a disgruntled public that believed it had no
input in the administration of justice. Criminal defendants were thought to
have all of the rights and protections under the law, and for many years they
did.
Now a majority of the state legislatures have adopted some form of
victim's rights laws, using the VWPA as their model. One important
component of most of these laws is restitution to the victim by the perpetra-
tor.2
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 (1988).
2. See ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-65 to 15-18-78 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.025(0,
12.55.051 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-804 to -814 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-90-301 to 310 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 155.5 (West
1988), 1203.1-1203. 1(West 1982 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 17-2-103(9) (a), 16-11-
101.5, 17-24-119, 18-6.5-106 (1986 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a) (4)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4101, 4104 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 944.485, 945.091(6), 945.31, 946.002, 947.181, 948.032, 775.089(12) (a) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-5 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-644 to -645 (1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-6, 1003-3-9(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-50-5-3,35-38-2-3(.) (Burns 1994& Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.1-910.15
(West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-4809 (Supp. 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.200
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(J) (West Supp. 1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1321-1330, tit. 30-A, § 1605 (West. 1983 & Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 276, §§ 92A (West 1972 & Supp. 1994); MIcH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 780.66-
.768 (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 99-37-1 to -25 (Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 211.083, 211.181(3) (6), 211.185, 559. 100 (Vernon Supp. 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-
2280 to -2289 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 176.189 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REV.
(Vol. 46:289
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CRIMINAL RESTUTION
The South Carolina General Assembly recently enacted its own criminal
restitution statute, which became effective on June 14, 1993.1 As with the
enactment of similar state and federal laws, the promulgation of the South
Carolina statute came at the unyielding behest of certain victim advocacy
groups and individuals.4 The legislative intent behind the enactment of this
bill was summarized as follows:
Under current law, defendants are not being forced to comply with orders
to pay fines and with restitution orders (parole is not being revoked upon
failure to pay restitution) and victims have no recourse. This bill was
introduced to create a way for property to be attached if a defendant fails
to pay ordered fines or restitution.'
Although the application of the criminal restitution statutes has yet to be
addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, cases have been decided on
the federal level as well as on various state levels that provide guidance as to
how these new laws will affect the adjudication of criminal justice in this state.
What follows in this Article is an analysis of state and federal laws and cases
to determine what they can tell us about the adequacy of our newly enacted
victim restitution statutes.
6
Part One focuses on the history of and problems encountered by federal
and state restitution statutes. It is divided into five sections. Section One
addresses the background and purpose of the criminal restitution statutes on
the federal and state levels. Section Two outlines the constitutional challenges
STAT. ANN. §§ 651:2, 651:22, 651:62-67 (1986 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:46-1
to -5, 30:4-91.4, 30:4-92, 30:8-26 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6
(Michie 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 420.10-.30 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1343 (1988 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-07, 12.1-32-08, 12.48.1-03,
32-03-09.2 (1976 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(B) (9) (Anderson 1993 &
Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 991a, 991a-3,991a-10, 991b (West 1986 & Supp.
1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-22-322 to -326, 17-25-125, 24-3-40, 16-3-1270, 24-21-480, 24-
23-220 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-27-25.1 to -27-25.6,
23A-28-1 to -28-13 (1988 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7-3-401 to -3-405, 41-6-101
to 6-207 (1990 & Supp. 1994); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (West 1979 &
Supp.1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-201.1, 77-18-6, 77-27-11 (1990 & Supp.
1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-305 to -305.2 (Michie
1990 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A. 145, 13.40.200 (West 1993 & Supp.
1994); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (1992 & Supp. 1994); WYo. STAT. §§ 7-9-101 to 9-115, 7-13-
421, 7-13-502, 7-16-205 (1987 & Supp 1994).
3. Act of June 14, 1993, 1993 S.C. Acts 140 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322to -
326 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)).
4. SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., STAFF SUMMARY REPORT TO THE GEN.
ASSEMBLY OF 1993, at 2 (1993) [hereinafter JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT].
5. Id.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322 to -326 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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the statutes have faced. Section Three provides guidance on collateral estoppel
and res judicata considerations on any subsequent civil action. Section Four
discusses what constitutes the "offense of conviction," and Section Five
outlines the scope of state and federal restitution under the revised VWPA.
Part Two of this article delves into the South Carolina restitution statute:
its history, shortcomings, and recommendations for its improvement. The
statute is compared with the VWPA as well as various other state statutes to
determine what the shortcomings in these statutes can tell us about the South
Carolina statute.
The Conclusion encompasses this writer's suggestions for improvements
to the South Carolina statute. It offers the author's views regarding the
changes that need to be made to the statutes to avoid the problems encountered
by the VWPA and other state criminal restitution statute.
PART ONE
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION STATUTES
When the federal government enacted the VWPA in October 1982, its
avowed purpose was "to strengthen existing legal protections for victims and
witnesses of Federal crimes .. . . I7 The Act's precursor was the declaration
of "Crime Victims' Week" in April 1982.8
Under the VWPA, the restitution provisions were originally codified at
18 U.S.C. sections 3579 and 3880.9 These sections underwent necessary
revisions as they were tested in the federal court system. Under the original
provisions, however, many cases were decided that set the pathway for state
legislatures and courts to follow. A closer analysis of the early version of the
VWPA clarifies what legal and constitutional challenges South Carolina's
restitution statute may have to endure.
There were several major provisions of the VWPA: 1) the requirement
that the sentencing judge receive a victim impact statement; 2) the requirement
of restitution for crimes involving property loss or personal injury; 3) the
establishment of civil liability of the federal government for bodily injury
caused by dangerous persons who have escaped or are released from federal
custody when the government is found to be grossly negligent; 4) requiring the
Attorney General to promulgate guidelines for the fair treatment of victims of
7. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515,
2515.
8. See 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2516. In declaring Crime Victim's Week, President Reagan
commented that the "plight of innocent citizens, victims of lawlessness, deserves immediate
national attention." Id.
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federal crimes; and 5) the requirement that the Attorney General recommend
legislation to prevent a felon from profiting from his crime's notoriety before
the victim is compensated.10
Section 3663 outlines the general provisions of the VWPA. Subsection
3663(a)(1) makes restitution discretionary."1 Under the former provisions,
if a court declined to order restitution, it was required to state its reasons for
that decision. 1
As is the case with many laws, the problems with the VWPA did not
surface until the statute was in court. 3 The VWPA does not clearly define
who is a crime "victim" for the purpose of awarding restitution. To promote
the rehabilitative goals of restitution, and also for equitable considerations,
courts have held that organizations and businesses, as well as individuals, may
be victims."4 The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
was deemed a victim when it acquired the claims of a defunct savings and loan
that had been defrauded. 5 Courts also have ruled that the Internal Revenue
Service, 6 an insurance company,' a county,'" the Department of La-
10. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 7, at 9-10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2515.
11. Section 3663(a) (1) provides, in relevant part: "The court, when sentencing a defendant
convicted of an offense under this title . . . . may order, in addition to or . . . in lieu of
any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (1) (1988).
12. Formerly, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) stated: "If the court does not order restitution, or
orders only partial restitution ... the court shall state on the record the reasons therefor." 18
U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (repealed 1986).
13. One commentator observed,
[A] major problem [of the VWPA] is the lack of specific definitions, which must be
remedied before the VWPA can function effectively. The basic terms "victim" and
"offense" are not clearly defined in the VWPA itself, its legislative history, or in the
Justice Department Guidelines. Such terms are vital to the VWPA's interpretation
in that they determine who may receive restitution and to what extent. The further
importance of clearly defining these terms is evident due to the fact that the VWPA
requires the judge to order restitution in every case involving Title 18 crimes, unless
he states the reason for not doing so.
Laura Munster Sever, Note, The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982: Who Are the
Victims of Which Offenses?, 20 VAL. U. L. Rv. 109, 110 (1985) (emphasis added).
14. The rationalebehind this policy, as explained by two commentators, is that "[d]efendants
should not be relieved of their obligation to make restitution simply because of the victims's
identity. In addition, it is inequitable not to compensate corporate or organizational victims who
suffer losses that ultimately are borne by the consumer or shareholder." The VWPA therefore
should be construed or amended to reflect this policy. Lorraine Slavin & David J. Sorin, Project,
Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 507, 524 (1984).
15. United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1515 (1992).
16. United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1162 (1992).
17. United States v. Youpee, 836 F.2d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Durham,
19951
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bor, 9 the Farmer's Home Administration,' an Indian health care ser-
vice,21 and Medicare? were victims entitled to restitution.
The idea of extending the definition of victim to include nonindividuals
is critical to the rehabilitative and penal goals of restitution. Although the
restitution statutes were passed in response to requests by individuals for
compensation to redress losses they had incurred as victims of crime, the goals
of restitution are the same for business and governmental entities that have
been injured by crime. This definition of victim also makes clear that a crime
perpetrated against a business is no less a crime than one perpetrated against
a human being; society's interests in penalizing the offender and compensating
the victim still are being met.
Many states have adopted their own versions of the VWPA just as the
drafters of the VWPA intended.24 For example, the Alabama legislature
enacted criminal restitution legislation.' Section 15-18-65 of the Alabama
Code explains the legislative purpose of the statute26 while section 15-18-67
sets forth the general restitution provisions.27 The statute does not specify
which courts have jurisdiction under the statute.
755 F.2d 511, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1985).
18. United States v. Ruffen, 780 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986).
19. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 892 (7th Cir.), opinion amended and reh'g
denied, 777 F.2d 345 (1985), and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986) (holding that the
Department of Labor is a "person" entitled to compensation under third-party payment provision
of VWPA).
20. United States v. Kirkland, 853 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1988).
21. United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1987).
22. United States v. Livingston, 770 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1073
(7th Cir. 1992).
23. See supra note 2.
24. See S. REP. No. 532, supra note 7, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2516.
The Senate report commented, "The bill has been drafted with the knowledge that the majority
of serious violent crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the State and local law enforcement
agencies. An important purpose of S.2420, therefore, is to provide a model statute for State and
local governments." Id.
25. ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-65 to 78 (1982 and Supp. 1993). The Alabama statute served as
a model for South Carolina's restitution statues.
26. Section 15-18-65 provides, "The legislature hereby finds, declares and determines that
it is essential to be fair and impartial in the administration of justice, that all perpetrators of
criminal activity or conduct be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct or activity
for any pecuniary loss, damage or injury as a direct or indirect result
thereof." ALA. CODE § 15-18-65 (1982).
27. Section 15-18-67 states, in pertinent part, "When a defendant is convicted of a criminal
activity or conduct which has resulted in pecuniary damages or loss to a victim, the court shall
hold a hearing to determine the amount or type of restitution due the victim or victims of such
defendant's criminal acts." ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (1975).
[Vol. 46:289
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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this ambiguity in Burt
v. City of Montgomery." The Montgomery municipal court ordered the
defendant, convicted of third-degree assault, to pay restitution to both of his
victims. The defendant appealed, claiming that the municipal court had no
jurisdiction to order him to pay restitution. In considering the defendant's
contention, the appellate court looked to the legislative intent to ascertain
whether, absent guidance on the issue, restitution should be imposed in all
criminal courts.29 The court ultimately rejected the defendant's argument and
held that the statute does not limit the authority to order restitution to any
particular court.3°
In an effort to quell the anger of victims of crime, Congress and many
state legislatures drafted restitution statutes in relative haste. The resulting
statutes often seemed carelessly thought out and were poorly written. Many
challenges have been raised against the federal and state restitution statutes,
especially jonstitutional challenges.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Sixth and Seventh Amendments
There have been several constitutional challenges to restitution statutes as
elements of civil and criminal law are commingled to afford relief to victims
of crime. Sixth and Seventh Amendment challenges have plagued the courts'
decisions under the restitution statutes.3" As one commentator stated, "[The
critical issue in determining the right to a jury trial is whether VWPA
restitution orders are criminal or civil in nature. If they are criminal, the Sixth
Amendment governs the right to jury trial; if they are civil, the Seventh
Amendment controls." 32
28. 598 So. 2d 5 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied (1992).
29. Id. at 8-9. The court stated, "In the area of statutory construction, the duty of a court
is to ascertain the legislative intent from the language used in the enactment. When the statutory
pronouncement is clear and not susceptible to a different interpretation, it is the paramount
judicial duty of a court to abide by that clear pronouncement." Id. (quoting Parker v. Hilliard,
567 So. 2d 1343, 1346 (Ala. 1990)).
30. Id. at 8.
31. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the criminal defendant
with the right to a speedy and public jury trial. It also affords the defendant the right "to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Seventh Amendment affords the
defendant the right to a trial by jury. U.S. CONsr. amend. VII.
32. Bonnie A. Von Roeder, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine Restitution Under the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 63 TEx. L. REv. 671, 673 (1984).
1995]
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At their restitution hearings, many criminal defendants asserted their
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury to get another jury trial. However,
a majority of courts have rejected this defense."
In 1984 the constitutionality of the VWPA was attacked in United States
v. Satterfield.34 The defendant was convicted of kidnapping a woman from
her home and forcing her to accompany him and his co-defendants from
Georgia to Alabama. 5 The district court refused to require the defendant to
pay $599 in restitution to cover the victim's medical expenses, holding that the
VWPA violated the defendant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The
government cross-appealed from the district court's decision.36
The Eleventh Circuit, ruling in favor of the government, rejected the
district court's position that collateral estoppel and civil enforcement
provisions of the VWPA made restitution a civil rather than criminal
penalty.37 Rather, the court stated that whether a penalty should be charac-
terized as civil or criminal is a question of legislative intent.3 Upon a
review of the legislative history of the VWPA, the Satterfield court concluded
that Congress intended restitution to be a criminal penalty.39
In United States v. Brown0 the Second Circuit held that the Seventh
Amendment was not a bar to ordering restitution, reasoning that restitution
was a permissible form of criminal punishment and noting that it was in place
at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.4 ' The defendant in Brown,
convicted of engaging in a scheme to defraud the public by holding himself out
as an attorney, appealed the restitution award on the ground that it violated his
right to a jury trial.42 The court rejected the defendant's contention, finding
that restitution is different from a civil judgment because it is assessed only
33. Id. at 691.
34. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
35. Id. at 831.
36. Id. at 833.
37. Id. at 837-38.
38. Id. at 836 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
39. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 837. The court found, "In drafting the restitution provisions of
the VWPA, Congress made clear in both the language of the statute and its accompanying
legislative history that victim restitution would be imposed as a criminal, rather than civil,
penalty." Id. at 836. The court explained, "The legislative history of the VWPA reenforces our
conclusion that Congress intended to make restitution an element of the criminal sentencing
process and not an independent action civil in nature. The history is replete with references to
restitution as part of the criminal sentence." 1d. at 837.
40. 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984).
41. Id. at 910. "[W]e note that judicially ordered restitution comports with the common law
practice at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted. Common law judges awarded
restitution in larceny cases, thereby sparing victims the need to pursue civil remedies." Id.
(citation omitted).
42. Id. at 908.
[Vol. 46:289
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after the defendant has been found guilty.43 After an adjudication of guilt,
there is no constitutional requirement that a jury determine any aspect of the
defendant's sentence.' Further, the court reasoned that, so long as restitu-
tion remains a permissible form of punishment, it is not subject to the civil
requirement of a jury trial simply because it also achieves the same purpose
as a civil judgment.45
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v.
Durham46 but for different reasons. In Durham the court held that the
defendant had no standing to assert his Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial because he did not dispute the accuracy of any facts concerning the
restitution amount. 47
As another ground for rejecting the Seventh Amendment defense, courts
have held that restitution under the VWPA is an equitable remedy not
requiring a jury determination.4" Speaking on this issue, the Seventh Circuit
stated,
Restitution is frequently an equitable remedy, meaning, of course, that
there is no right of jury trial. The Supreme Court has suggested that resti-
tution of back pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an
equitable remedy not requiring a jury. The same, it seems to us, is true
of restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982."9
During the same year that Brown was decided in Second Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same issue in United States v.
43. Id. at 909.
44. Brown, 744 F.2d at 908.
45. Id. at 909. The court observed that many of the goals of restitution are penal:
Restitution undoubtedly serves traditional purposes of punishment. The prospect of
having to make restitution adds to the deterrent effect of imprisonment and
fines .... Restoring the victim's property also serves the legitimate penal purpose
of vindicating society's interest in peaceful retribution. Finally, restitution can be a
useful step toward rehabilitation .... These penal purposes have long been
promoted through the imposition of fines payable to the Treasury; their achievement
is not lessened because the immediate beneficiary of a restitution order is the crime
victim.
Id. at 909 (citation omitted).
46. 755 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1985).
47. Id. at 514. "The purpose of the procedural devices Durham seeks-jury trial, discovery,
and cross-examination-is to enhance the accuracy of factual determinations. Where the claimant
does not dispute the accuracy of any factual finding, invocation of jury trial and due process
guarantees is not proper." Id.
48. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801 (7th Cir.), opinion amended and reh'g
denied, 777 F.2d 345 (1985) and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986).
49. Id. (citations omitted).
1995]
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Watchman." The defendant, who pleaded guilty to assault with intent to
murder, contended that he was entitled to a jury trial on the amount of
restitution to be awarded under the VWPA. The court, citing Brown, held that
restitution is a permissible penalty that can be imposed on a defendant as a
part of sentencing.51 The court explained, "The restitution procedure does
not infringe on Seventh Amendment rights. The basic concept of restitu-
tion. . . was in place when the Seventh Amendment was adopted. "12
The Fourth Circuit, however, in United States v. Dudley3 came to a
different ruling. It held that the restitution provision of the VWPA was civil,
allowing the victim of the crime to recover the restitution award from the
defendant's estate.54 The defendant, convicted of conspiracy to use and
unlawful use of food stamps, was ordered to reimburse the Agriculture
Department the value of the stolen stamps. However, during the pendency of
his appeal, the defendant died.55
The defendant's attorney argued that, like all criminal penalties, the duty
to pay ends at the death of the defendant.56 The Circuit Court, however,
concluded that restitution differed from the other forms of punishment given
to the defendant as it was primarily compensatory.57 The defendant's
attorney attacked the constitutionality of the VWPA, as it provided for a civil
penalty without affording the defendant the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. s The Fourth Circuit considered this issue moot, since the attorney
failed to object to the correctness of the restitution amount. Therefore, no
issue of fact existed to be tried by a jury.59
The Dudley ruling has been criticized. Commentators look to the rule of
abatement ab initio, reasoning that the death of a criminal defendant pending
appeal abates all proceedings from the beginning of the prosecution. As such,
all convictions are void from their inception; therefore, no criminal conviction
existed in Dudley upon which to base the restitution award.'
In 1986, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered the issue of
a defendant's right to trial by jury at the restitution hearing. In Rice v.
50. 749 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 617.
52. Id.
53. 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id. at 176.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 177.
58. Dudley, 739 F.2d at 178.
59. Id. at 179.
60. Barbara J. Taylor, Note, Abatement of Restitution Orders Under the Victim and Witness
Protection Act, 42 WASH. & LEE L. R. 557, 570 (1985).
[Vol. 46:289
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Alabama,61 the defendant, convicted of first-degree robbery, challenged the
Alabama criminal restitution statute as unconstitutional. The defendant
maintained that the language of the Alabama restitution statute made restitution
a civil judgment;62 therefore, he argued, the Seventh Amendment afforded
him the right to a trial by jury on the amount of restitution.63 The court
disagreed. Looking to the federal courts for guidance since Alabama courts
had not addressed the issue, the court observed, "Under 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h)
[replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1988)], an order of restitution may be
enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action."' According
to the court, however, this alone did not make restitution a civil penalty.'
In determining whether the enforcement provision of the restitution statute
made it civil and thus entitled the defendant to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, the Rice court looked to the legislative intent of the statute.'
The court followed the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Satterfield,67 which concluded that the VWPA "intended to make restitution
an element of the criminal sentencing process and not an independent action
civil in nature."68 The Satterfleld court also noted that the VWPA permits
the imposition of restitution only after a determination of certain factors, such
as the financial ability of the defendant to pay. The court reasoned that the
statute's consideration of the defendant's financial condition comports with the
rehabilitative purpose of ordering restitution and noted that this factor
generally is not considered in determining the amount of damages in a civil
trial.69 The Rice court, observing that Alabama's statute contained provisions
similar to those found in the VWPA, followed Satterfield in holding that
restitution is a criminal penalty 0 and, consequently, that a jury trial is not
61. 491 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
62. Id. at 1052. Section 15-18-78 of the Alabama statute provides that "[a] restitution order
in a criminal case shall be a final judgment and have all the force and effect of a final judgment
in a civil action under the laws of the state of Alabama." ALA. CODE § 15-18-78 (Supp. 1994).
63. Rice, 491 So. 2d at 1052.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1052-53.
67. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 837.
69. Id. at 836-37.
70. Rice, 491 So. 2d at 1052. The court found
Subsection 3579(a)(1) allows the court to prove restitution "in addition to or in lieu
of any other penalty authorized by law" as a part of the "sentencing" of the defen-
dant ....
Consistent with this characterization of restitution as part of a criminal sentence
are subsection 3580(a) and (b), which incorporate the restitution order into the
traditional sentencing role of the court. Under subsection 3580(a), the court can
order restitution only after it considers the financial resources of the defendant, his
19951
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required to determine the amount of restitution as the constitutional guarantee
applies only to civil damages cases and not to a penalty such as restitution
imposed by a court in a criminal proceeding.71
Criminal defendants also have challenged restitution awards under the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Hill v. Bradford' the Supreme Court
of Alabama held that the defendant had a right to counsel at the restitution
hearing in the absence of any waiver of his rights.73
Thus, although a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present at the
restitution hearing exists,74 under these federal and state statutes there is no
comparable Seventh Amendment right to have a jury determination of the
amount of restitution to be awarded?5 Because restitution is a part of the
sentencing phase of the criminal trial, it should be accorded the same status as
fines and other penalties that are imposed without the presence of a jury. This
conclusion also comports with the fact that restitution's major purpose is
penal.
B. Fifth Amendment
Criminal restitution awards have been challenged as violating the Fifth
Amendment.7 6 In United States v. Satterfield the -defendants questioned the
adequacy of procedural safeguards at the sentencing phase. The defendants
also challenged the admissibility of hearsay evidence at sentencing.' The
district court ruled in the defendants' favor, holding that the defendants' right
to a fair hearing had been denied at the sentencing phase and that the
imposition of restitution had been arbitrary. 78  On appeal, the court recog-
nized that the VWPA provided few standards for determining the restitution
owed to the victim or the ability of the defendant to pay. The court conclud-
ed, however,
earning ability and the financial needs of his dependents. These considerations, which
help tailor restitution to the individuality of the defendant, are vital to the rehabilita-
tion goals of sentencing, but generally are not relevant in determining the amount of
damages awarded in a civil case.
Id. (quoting Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 836-37 (footnotes omitted)) (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 1052.
72. 565 So. 2d 208 (Ala. 1990).
73. Id. at 210 (citing Williams v. Alabama, 506 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), cert.
denied, 506 So. 2d 372 (Ala. 1987)).
74. Id. at 210.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1984).
76. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
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that the VWPA, together with the dictates of Rule 32 [of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure], contains sufficient safeguards to ensure that a
sentencing judge... will award restitution based on accurate facts and
premises ..... Rule 32(a)(1)(C) creates additional procedural protection
by assuring the defendant the opportunity "to make a statement in his own
behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment."79
These procedural safeguards adequately protect against infringement of the
defendant's due process rights. The defendant may present evidence to
counter the government's assertion as to the appropriate amount of restitution.
Additionally, the requirement that a judge examine the finances of the
defendant and consider several other factors before determining the amount of
restitution provides sufficient protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights.
A criminal defendant's due process rights also require that the court
consider alternative forms of punishment before revoking the defendant's
parole for inability to pay restitution. The Third Circuit so held in United
States v. Palma, I stating that "before the probation or parole of a defendant
who has in good faith attempted to comply with a restitution order may be
revoked, the court or the Parole Commission must consider whether alternative
punishment measures are available." 8'
C. Eighth Amendment
Eighth Amendment challenges to restitution statutes have failed to
withstand the scrutiny of the courts. In United States v. Ciambrone" the
defendant, convicted of racketeering and conspiracy, challenged the VWPA's
restitution provision as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment by permitting incarceration for the
failure to pay a debt. 3 The court, however, held that the statute does not
violate the Eighth Amendment because under the statute the determination of
whether a defendant's probation should be revoked must be predicated upon
the availability of alternative forms of punishment as well as a consideration
of statutory factors relating to the defendant's ability to pay."
79. Id. at 840 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(c) (amended 1993)).
80. 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 479.
82. 602 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. Id. at 568. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII.
84. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. at 569.
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In 1987, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals confronted an Eighth
Amendment challenge to the state's restitution statute in Wiggins v. Ala-
bama.' In Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of first-degree theft in the
embezzlement of funds from her employer.8 6 She appealed the amount of
restitution the court ordered her to pay. Relying upon the Eighth Amendment,
the defendant argued that forcing her to pay almost $90,000 to her employer
(the city of Andalusia, Alabama) amounted to an excessive fine and cruel and
unusual punishment as she had limited resources and her employer was
financially well off." Unpersuaded by the defendant's argument, the court
held that the fine was not excessive and the punishment not cruel and unusual;
instead, the court placed priority on the goal of fully compensating the
victim.8
The federal VWPA provides that a court should consider several factors
before ordering restitution, including the loss to the victim and the finances
and earning ability of the defendant.89 A court also will review the defen-
dant's finances before revoking the defendant's probation or parole for a
failure to pay restitution.'
D. Fourteenth Amendment
What occurs when a defendant cannot afford to pay restitution? The
United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Bearden v. Georgia.9
In Bearden the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and theft and was
ordered to pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution as a condition to his
probation. The defendant paid the first installment of $200 but was unable to
pay the rest. As a result, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced
him to serve the remainder of his probationary period in prison.92
On appeal before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that he was
financially unable to pay the fine and restitution. The Court held that the
85. 513 So. 2d 73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
86. Id. at74.
87. Id. at 79.
88. Id. Concerning the restitution statute, the court stated, "It is clear to us . . . that it
is the intent of the legislature that victims be fully conipensated through restitution." Id. (quoting
Exparte Clare, 456 So. 2d 357, 358 (Ala. 1984)).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. V 1993). More specifically, § 3664(a) provides that a
court, in determining the amount of restitution, should consider "the amount of the loss sustained
by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial
needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors
as the court deems appropriate." Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(g) (Supp. V 1993).
91. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
92. Id. at 662-63.
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defendant could not be imprisoned solely because he was unable to pay the
restitution amount.' If the refusal to pay were willful, however, the
defendant's probation could be revoked.94
The Court further held that the fundamental fairness strictures of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that the defendant not be punished for his
inability to pay. 95 The state may not use as the sole justification for impris-
onment the poverty or inability of the probationer to pay the fine and make
restitution if he has demonstrated a sufficient bona fide effort to do so.96
However, if a defendant is indigent but has the future earning ability to
make the restitution payments, the restitution amount will be upheld. In
United States v. Brown9' the court held that an obligation to pay restitution
may be imposed on a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing but
subsequently acquires a means of discharging his debts. 98 Courts have
recognized that judges would be severely restricted in imposing restitution
awards if they did not have the authority to discount present indigence when
determining if restitution should be awarded.99 Nevertheless, restitution can
be avoided when the defendant and the state agree that the defendant does not
have the present or future ability to pay."
A criminal defendant need not be accorded the same degree of due
process at the sentencing phase of the proceeding that he or she is entitled to
at the trial. 101 The defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
are sufficiently safeguarded when he or she is assured the right to receive
93. Id. at 667-68.
94. Id. at 668.
95. Id. at 672. The Court explained,
Only if alternative measures [of punishment] are not adequate to meet the State's
interests in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own,
he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental
fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-673.
96. Id. at 669-73.
97. 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984).
98. Id. at 911.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Rice, 954 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States
v. Atkinson, 788 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1986)).
100. See United States v. Mcllvain, 967 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th Cir. 1992).
101. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984). The court explained,
Because the sentencing procedure is not a trial, courts have limited this [due process]
right in order to prevent the sentencing hearing from becoming a full-scale evidentiary
hearing. The degree of protection required is only that which is necessary to ensure
that the district court is sufficiently informed to enable it to exercise its sentencing
discretion in an enlightened manner.
Id. at 840 (citations omitted).
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notice of the hearing and the opportunity to present evidence.'"2 In United
States v. Satterfield't 3 the defendants argued that the due process require-
ments of fairness and a nonarbitrary exercise of power were infringed because
they did not receive during sentencing the same procedural protections
afforded them at trial. "4 The court, however, held that the defendants' due
process rights were adequately protected at the sentencing phase.' 5 Noting
that due process requires only that the defendant have notice and a right to be
heard, the court stated that the defendants' only protectable interest was their
right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or inaccurate inform-
ation. 106
The California Court of Appeals in California v. Goulart" explored the
fundamental fairness of ordering restitution as a condition of probation. The
defendant pleaded guilty to one of nine counts of interfering with an electrical
line. The other counts against him were dropped.'03 The sentencing court
ordered restitution for instances of tampering besides the count to which the
defendant pleaded."° The court of appeals held that the restitution order did
not violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights because the defendant
had not shown that the evidence considered by the judge was unreliable." 0
E. The Supremacy Clause and Bankrupt Defendants
Criminal defendants increasingly have used bankruptcy laws in an attempt
to discharge state court restitution orders. Although the automatic stay
provision of the bankruptcy code generally stays all actions brought against a
debtor in bankruptcy,"' an exception to the stay provision allows criminal
proceedings against the debtor to continue." 2 The bankruptcy court may
stay a state criminal proceeding, however, when the court deems it necessary
to carry out the intent of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code."'
102. United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1990).
103. 743 F.2d 827 (1lth Cir. 1984).
104. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839.
105. 1d. at 841.
106. Id. at 840.
107. 273 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
108. Id. at 479.
109. Id. at 480.
110. Id. at 482-83.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1988). See also Michelangelo Scafidi, Comment,
Circumventing State Court Orders of Criminal Restitution: A Bankruptcy Loophole, 19 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 449, 453-54 (1986).
113. Scafidi, supra note 112 at 454; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (1988) ("The court may




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss2/5
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Under the authority of the Supremacy Clause the bankruptcy court may
even void a state restitution law if it conflicts with or obstructs the purpose of
the bankruptcy law. This scenario occurred in Perez v. Campbell,"4 in
which the defendant, the at-fault driver in an automobile accident, was sued
by the other individuals involved in the accident.' Judgment was rendered
against the defendant under a statute that specifically prohibited the avoidance
of this type of debt through bankruptcy." 6 The defendant thereafter filed for
bankruptcy, and the Supreme Court held the state statute invalid because the
Supremacy Clause proscribes such a conflict between the state statute and the
federal Bankruptcy Code."17
The United States Supreme Court also has indicated that state court
criminal proceedings might be enjoined in certain circumstances. In Younger
v. Harris"' the Court stated that a federal court may enjoin a state criminal
court proceeding when the prosecution is acting in bad faith." 9 Many
bankruptcy courts have followed this reasoning, typically enjoining restitution
awards in cases involving checks returned for insufficient funds."2  The
courts usually base their decisions on the belief that the victim's main interest
is collecting a debt and not punishing the criminal defendant."'
Other courts have said, however, that restitution is not a debt and
therefore is not dischargeable under the bankruptcy laws. In making this
determination, the courts look to the definitions of "debt," "claim," and
"creditor."" In In re Johnson," for example, the court stated that resti-
tution was not a debt and that the victim was not a creditor for bankruptcy
purposes. 
124
In an effort to resolve this split between the courts on the issue of the
dischargeabiity of restitution under bankruptcy, the United States Supreme
Court recently ruled in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenport"z that state criminal restitution obligations are "debts" under 11
U.S.C. § 101(11) and are dischargeable under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code. l2
114. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
115. Id. at 638.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 652.
118. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
119. Id. at 54.
120. Scafidi, supra note 112, at 456-57.
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id. at 462.
123. 32 B.R. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (mem.).
124. Id. at 615-17.
125. 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
126. Id. at 564.
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Chapter 13 provides for a restructuring of the debtor's obligations while
he or she attempts to pay them off. It therefore has a rehabilitative effect on
the debtor, not unlike the criminal restitution statutes. 7 In an effort to
make the payment of debts more attractive to the debtor than the liquidation
of his or her assets, Chapter 13 allows the discharge of more debts than does
Chapter 7.128 In response to the ruling in Davenport Congress specifically
amended the discharge section2 9 to exclude from its provisions a debt for
restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.130
Bankrupt debtors also have tried to discharge criminal restitution debts
under Chapter 7.131 In Kelly v. Robinson 3 1 the United States Supreme
Court held that restitution obligations under Chapter 7 fall within the scope of
section 523(a)(7),133 which provides that a debt may not be discharged "to
the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss." 34  Exceptions to discharge under Section 523(a)(7) do not apply to
successful Chapter 13 plans.13
On October 7, 1994, Congress adopted legislation that amended the
Bankruptcy Code to bar debtors from discharging criminal fines under Chapter
13.136 Congress passed the legislation in an effort to further strengthen
creditors' rights. As a result of these amendments, criminal restitution and
fines, once included as dischargeable debts under Chapter 13 plans, can no
longer be discharged in bankruptcy. It would seem only just that restitution
owed to victims of crime would not be considered a debt for bankruptcy
purposes. Since criminal restitution is primarily penal, a criminal defendant
should not be permitted to discharge a part of his sentence in bankruptcy
court.
127. Carol Malz-Meaders, Case Note, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v.
Davenport: Are Criminal Restitution Obligations Dischargeable Under Chapter 13?, 37 LoY.
L. REv. 155, 156-58 (1991).
128. Id. at 159.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3).
130. See People v. Warnes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (1992).
131. See Malz-Meaders, supra note 127, at 160-63.
132. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
133. Id. at 52.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)/(7) (1988).
135. Malz-Meaders, supra note 127, at 165.
136. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 1994 H.R. 5116; 103 H.R. 5116.
[Vol. 46:289
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss2/5
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Im. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA CONSIDERATIONS
IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL ACTIONS
The doctrine of collateral estoppel traditionally has had three essential
elements: "(1) the parties and issues must be identical; (2) the particular matter
must be fully litigated and determined; and (3) the litigation must result in a
final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction." 3' However, federal
courts have abandoned the mutuality of parties requirement, allowing the use
of criminal convictions in later civil suits to estop litigation of issues decided
in the criminal case. 38
The VWPA sought to clarify what effect a finding of guilt in a criminal
action would have on a later civil proceeding. The legislative intent was that
the underlying facts of an adjudicated crime would be treated as res judicata
in a subsequent civil proceeding 39 so that a criminal conviction would
obviate the victim's need to establish liability in a subsequent civil suit for
damages."4  This policy is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).1 41 The VW-
PA's requirement that a conviction be obtained before collateral estoppel can
be invoked again raises the issue of what constitutes a conviction for restitution
purposes. One commentator has stated, "[Tihe issue that arises is a matter of
statutory interpretation, and it must be determined whether a judgment entered
in a criminal case pursuant to a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a
'conviction' within the meaning of the statute."142 A majority of courts
addressing the issue have ruled that a nolo plea generally constitutes a
conviction in other settings.143
137. Thomas D. Sawaya, Use of Criminal Convictions in Civil Proceedings-Statutory
Collateral Estoppel Under Florida and Federal Law, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1988, at 17, 18, (citing
Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964); Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th
Cir. 1958); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952)).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Glantz, 837 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1988); Appley v. West, 832
F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987).
139. S. REP. No. 532, supra note 7, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2537.
140. Id. at 2638.
141. Section 3664(e) provides:
A conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the act giving rise to restitution
under this section shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of
that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil proceeding, to
the extent consistent with State law, brought by the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1988).
142. Sawaya, supra note 137, at 19.
143. Id. at 19 (citing Sokoloffv. Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1974)). The Sokoloff court
stated, "Where ... a statute (or judicial rule) attaches legal consequences to the fact of a
conviction, the majority of courts have held that there is no valid distinctionbetween a conviction
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Res judicata treatment at the subsequent civil trial is accorded only those
elements of an offense proven at the criminal trial.," The court in United
States v. Brown, 45 when analyzing what was then section 3580(e) (now
section 3664(e)) of the VWPA, rejected the defendant's assertion that the res
judicata provision unconstitutionally blurred the distinction between a criminal
sentence and a civil judgment.'46  The court in United States v. Satter-
field'47 also followed this approach, holding that acts that support a restitu-
tion order but that are not a part of the essential allegations underlying the
defendant's conviction must be litigated at the civil proceeding.'48
But what happens if the order of the criminal and civil proceedings are
reversed, and the civil suit is dismissed before the criminal suit goes to trial?
In such an instance, a federal court still could impose restitution as a form of
punishment in the criminal proceeding. The issue of whether ordering
restitution would further the penal goals of the restitution statute would not
have been litigated in the civil proceeding.' 49
Alabama has codified the doctrine of collateral estoppel into its restitution
statute.' 5 Florida followed suit in 1984 with the enactment of Florida
Statutes section 775.089(8).' 5' The language of the Florida statute is almost
identical to that of section 3663(a)(2) of the VWPA.'52 The Florida statute
additionally provides for an offset in the amount of civil recovery based upon
the amount recovered by the victim through restitution from the criminal
action. 
5
The doctrine of collateral estoppel should be imposed at a civil hearing
subsequent to a criminal trial. Such a policy decreases the amount of court
144. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 910.
147. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
148. Id. at 838. The court explained,
The facts underlying a criminal offense that gives rise to a restitution order will be
given collateral estoppel effect only if they were fully and fairly litigated at the
criminal trial, or stipulated through a guilty plea. The collateral estoppel provision
of the VWPA does not contravene congressional intent, convert the restitution aspect
of the sentencing hearing into a civil proceeding, or deny the defendant his right to
a jury trial under the seventh amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
149. See United States v. Hairston, 888 F.2d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 1989).
150. Section 15-18-75 of the Alabama Code provides, "If conviction in a criminal trial
necessarily decides the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages for a victim, that
issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant, if it is involved in a subsequentcivil action."
ALA. CODE § 15-18-75 (1982).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(8) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
152. Sawaya, supra note 137, at 17.
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(8) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
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time necessary to litigate the civil action by affording judicial notice of certain
facts litigated at the criminal level. Moreover, it saves the victim added legal
expenses.
IV. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION:
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION
A. The VWPA
1. The Circuits Split
Numerous courts have addressed how restitution is determined. Questions
have arisen, however, concerning whether restitution is limited to those
offenses for which the defendant pleaded guilty or was convicted.. The federal
circuit courts interpreted the VWPA's provision allowing restitution for "the
offense of conviction" in several different ways. Several of the circuits had
allowed restitution for acts beyond the offenses for which the defendant was
convicted or to which the defendant pleaded guilty so long as the acts were
somehow "related" to those offenses. Others limited restituion to the act
underlying the conviciton. The split ultimately was resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in Hughey v. United States.1
54
Before Hughey settled the issue, the Second Circuit held that a defendant
would be liable to a victim for losses beyond the specified charge for which
the defendant was convicted so long as the victim suffered losses from the
defendant's "related" course of conduct. 55 The Tenth Circuit allowed
restitution for other criminal acts of the defendant that had a "significant
connection" to the act of conviction. 56 The Fifth Circuit followed suit,
allowing restitution for losses beyond the amount involved in the offense of
conviction when there was a significant connection between that offense and
other offenses for which the defendant was not convicted.
157
In United States v. Walker5 . the Eighth Circuit adopted a similar
approach, stating that the VWPA should be construed broadly to allow
restitution for acts beyond those that underlie the offense of conviction. 5 9
The defendants in Walker were convicted of tax evasion and conspiring to
defraud the federal government by the improper diversion of income from
154. 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
155. United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1989).
156. United States v. Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1536 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 906
(1989).
157. United States v. Hughey, 877 F.2d 1256, 1264 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 495 U.S. 411
(1990).
158. 896 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 306.
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their family-owned corporation."6° The district court ordered the defendants
to make restitution to the company's employees, who lost their jobs when the
company filed for bankruptcy.16 The Eighth Circuit agreed that restitution
could be ordered if there was a significant connection between the crime of
conviction and the other acts. 62 However, the court found an insufficient
link between the defendants' criminal acts and the company's bankruptcy that
led to the employees' loss of their jobs. 63
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pomazi'" held that in cases
involving a continuing scheme to defraud, "it is within the power of the court
to require restitution of any amount up to the entire illicit gain from such a
scheme, even if only some specific incidents are the basis of the guilty
plea. "165
Courts have also awarded restitution for dismissed or even uncharged
crimes, so long as they were committed with the same state of mind as the
crime for which the defendant was convicted."6 In California v. Goulart the
court, noting that one of the purposes of restitution is rehabilitation of the
defendant, stated that the trial court was not limited "to imposing restitution
for losses resulting from crimes of which the defendant was convicted."167
The court continued, "A court may also consider crimes which were charged
but dismissed; uncharged crimes, the existence of which is readily apparent
from the facts elicited at trial; or even charges of which the defendant was
acquitted, if justice requires they be considered." 16  The Goulart court
found that in ordering restitution it was within the trial judge's discretion to
consider thefts for which the defendant had not been charged. 169
Courts have allowed restitution awards for amounts greater than alleged
in the indictment, so long as the defendant agrees to the amount. In United
160. Id. at 296.
161. Id. at 305.
162. Id. at 306.
163. Walker, 896 F.2d at 306. The court observed,
In this case the record shows an insufficient factual nexus between the conspiracy
committed by the Walkers and C-66's bankruptcy, the closing of the business, and
loss of employee's salaries .... Simply put, there is no showing that the employees
of C-66 lost their jobs as a result of actions taken by the Walkers surrounding the
commission of their offense.
Id.
164. 851 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 249 (quoting United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (7th Cir. 1982)).
166. See, e.g., Californiav. Goulart, 273 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
California v. Richards, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1976)).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 481.
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States v. Kirkland70 the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant who enters a plea
agreement requiring him to pay an amount of restitution greater than that
alleged in the indictment cannot later challenge the amount as excessive.
17'
The court observed that "[tjhe [other] courts that have considered the issue
agree that the amount of restitution may be established by a plea agree-
ment. " "7r Moreover, the court indicated that a restitution hearing is not
necessary if the defendant does not dispute the amount of restitution award-
ed. 173
The Ninth Circuit agreed with this proposition in United States v.
Whitney. 74  The Whitney court there stated that a plea agreement that
specifically determines the amount of restitution will be enforced when the
defendant has freely and voluntarily agreed to it and the agreement has been
examined in open court. 75
Other circuits have held that restitution should be limited to the offense
for which the defendant was charged. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Barnette76 held that the VWPA allows restitution only for
actual losses that flow from the offense of conviction.'"
2. Hughey v. United States
From its inception, the VWPA was interpreted differently by appellate
courts throughout the country, causing a split of decisions among the circuits
as discussed above. No firm decision existed on whether a defendant could
be required to pay restitution for acts other than those underlying the offense
of conviction until the United States Supreme Court conclusively decided the
issue in May 1990 in Hughey v. United States.
78
In Hughey the defendant pleaded guilty to using one unauthorized credit
card but did not admit to any of the other charges against him.17 9  The
government petitioned the district court to require the defendant to pay
restitution for unauthorized credit card losses in excess of the losses for which
he was convicted."s The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the Fifth
Circuit, held that restitution under the VWPA is authorized only for the losses
170. 853 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1988).
171. Id. at 1251.
172. Id. at 1249 (citing United States v. Grugette, 678 F.2d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 1982)).
173. Id. at 1248 n.6.
174. 838 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1988) (order amending prior opinion).
175. Id. at 404.
176. 800 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935 (1987).
177. Id. at 1571.
178. 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
179. Id. at 413-14.
180. Id. at 414.
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caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction and not for losses
resulting from other acts."' The court reasoned
Given that the ordinary meaning of "restitution" is restoring someone to
a position he occupied before a particular event, the repeated focus in
§ 3579 [of the VWPA] on the offense of which the defendant was
convicted suggests strongly that restitution as authorized by the statute is
intended to compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct
underlying the offense of conviction."
The Court failed to recognize expressly the ambiguity of the phrase
"offense of conviction" as set forth in the VWPA. However, the Court found
that even if the statute were ambiguous, in light of the longstanding principles
favoring leniency toward criminal defendants in the application of ambiguous
laws the defendant should be required to pay restitution only for the acts for
which he was convicted.8 3  Despite the attempt to create a uniform ap-
proach, the federal circuits interpreted Hughey differently when attempting to
define what constitutes the offense of conviction.
3. VWPA Revisions After Hughey v. United States
a. General Provisions
The passing of years found the VWPA being applied in increasingly more
diverse cases and causes of action. This expansion resulted not only from a
more liberal statutory interpretation but from legislative amendment. In an
effort to address the limitations of the VWPA demonstrated by Hughey and
other challenges to its legality, Congress made numerous revisions to the
statute. 114
One of the more recent amendments to the VWPA, effective November
29, 1990, was enacted as a part of the Crime Control Act of 1990.1 This
amendment broadened in many respects the jurisdiction and scope of cases
181. Id. at 416.
182. Id. (citation omitted).
183. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 422.
184. Pub. L. 99-646, §§ 8(b), 20(a), 77(a), 78(a), 79(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3593,
3596, 3618, 3619; Pub. L. 100-182, § 13, Dec. 7, 1987, 101 Stat. 1268; Pub.L. 100-185, § 12,
Dec. 11, 1987, 101 Stat. 1285; Pub. L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7042, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat.
4399; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXV, § 2509, Title XXXV, § 3595, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat.
4863, 4931.
185. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789.
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covered under the VWPA. The restitution provisions are renumbered and
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3664.186
An amendment to section 3663(a)(1) makes clear that the statute applies
to all courts with criminal jurisdiction," resolving the type of ambiguity
considered in Burt v. City of Montgomery.'
Bcause of the revision to the VWPA that expands the phrase "victim of
an offense" to include those involved in schemes and conspiracies, 18 9 the
circuits give different interpretations to whether the entire "scheme or
conspiracy" constitutes the "offense of conviction." Section 3663(a)(2)
expands the scope of cases in which a restitution order may be issued and the
types of victims to whom restitution may be awarded, absent a showing to the
contrary. 9° The new provision is a profound change from section 3579(2),
its precursor. 191
Under section 3663(a)(3) restitution is authorized for offenses beyond
those for which the defendant is convicted so long as there is a plea agreement
to that effect. 19
b. Circuits Remain Split
i. Plea Agreements
In spite of the revisions to the VWPA, the federal circuits have reached
different conclusions on whether a criminal defendant, even with his consent,
may be ordered to pay restitution in excess of the amount attributable to the
offense of conviction. The amendments to the VWPA, enacted in large part
to limit the holding in Hughey, were tested in United States v. Rice.93 The
defendant in Rice, having pleaded guilty to making false statements to a
federally insured bank, agreed to make restitution for losses to the victims that
exceeded the counts to which he pleaded guilty."9
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (Supp. V 1993).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) currently provides, "The court, when sentencing a defendant
convicted of an offense under this title ... may order, in addition to or, in the case of a
misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution
to any victim of such offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
188. See 598 So. 2d 5, 8 (Ala.'Ct. Crim. App. 1991) cert. denied (1992) (holding that
municipal court has jurisdiction under state criminal restitution statute).
189. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2509(2), 104 Stat. 4789 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993)).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (Supp. III 1985), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (Supp. V 1993).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The section reads: "The court may also order
restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." Id.
193. 954 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 41.
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The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hughey after the defendant
pleaded guilty but before he was sentenced. At his sentencing hearing,
however, the defendant did not raise any objections to his restitution payment
based on Hughey. Although the sentencing court initially left the restitution
amount to be decided by the parties, the court later scheduled a restitution
hearing because the parties failed to reach an agreement.Z95
By the time of the restitution hearing, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) had been
in effect for six months. 196 At the restitution hearing the defendant for the
first time raised a Hughey defense, arguing that restitution should be limited
to the offenses for which he had pleaded guilty.197 The court disagreed and
noted that section 3663(a)(3) was in effect when the defendant was ordered to
pay restitution; therefore, the amount of restitution would be the amount
ordered by the district court pursuant to the plea agreement. 198
The court in United States v. Winkler'99 followed this line of reasoning
when it upheld the amount of restitution provided for in a plea agreement.
The plea agreement in Winkler allowed the sentencing court to determine the
amount of restitution based oni the amount of the civil judgments against the
defendant and the defendant's financial circumstances." The court
distinguished its case from Hughey on two grounds. First, Hughey did not
involve this type of plea agreement. Second, Hughey was decided before
section 3663(a)(3) was adopted and held that "the sentencing court could not
properly rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3579, the predecessor to the pre-amendment
version of § 3663, to authorize such a restitution order. ""2
The government has attempted to use the revisions in the VWPA to obtain
restitution from a defendant based upon his or her plea agreement. In United
States v. Cockerham, 2 however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
this reasoning in its interpretation of Hughey. In Cockerham the criminal
defendant entered a plea agreement with the government that the government
argued could be used to provide an alternative basis for calculating restitu-
tion.23 The court disagreed with the government's contention, stating that
195. Id. at 42.
196. Id. at 44.
197. Id. at 42.
198. Rice, 954 F.2d at 44.
199. 817 F. Supp. 1530 (D. Kan. 1993) (mem. and order).
200. Id. at 1536.
201. Id.
202. 919 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1990). The court noted, "According to Hughey, restitution based
on a loss resulting from acts for which Cockerham was not convicted is inappropriate." Id. at
288.
203. Id. at 288 n.2.
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it would "decline to depart from the Supreme Court's clear mandate in
Hughey."'
In United States v. Young' the defendant, a bank manager, approved
certain loans in return for payments from the loan recipients. He pleaded
guilty to "two counts of accepting and receiving a commission or gift in
connection with approval of a loan by a bank officer."' In return for the
guilty plea, the government stipulated that the defendant would not be charged
with any subsequent crimes committed while he was at the bank. The plea
agreement also provided for restitution that was not limited to the counts to
which he pleaded guilty. The defendant appealed his sentence, which included
a $1.5 million dollar restitution payment to the bank.'
The court sided with the defendant in finding the restitution amount to be
inappropriate. The court ruled that even if the defendant in return for a
dismissal of other offenses consented to restitution for losses other than those
stemming from the acts upon which the conviction was based, the restitution
amount could not be upheld. 8
The Young opinion is consistent with Hughey in that it limits the scope of
a restitution award to those offenses for which the defendant is convicted even
in the presence of a plea agreement that provides for additional compensa-
tion. 9
Other circuits have followed the spirit of Hughey, restricting restitution
to losses from the acts to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or significant-
ly connected acts.21°
A minority of the courts, however, giving a narrow interpretation to
Hughey, have accepted plea agreements that provide restitution for acts other
than those for which the defendant was convicted.2 Some courts have
204. Id.
205. 953 F.2d 1288 (11th Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 1289.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1290.
209. The Young court explained,
The relevant version of the VWPA, in turn, limits restitution to only those crimes for
which the defendant has been convicted. . . . Parties to a plea agreement cannot
increase the statutory powers of the sentencing judge to authorize restitution simply
by stipulating to restitution beyond that allowed under the relevant version of the
[Victim Witness Protection] Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
210. See United States v. Fuentes, 991 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States
v. Cobbs, 967 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); United States v. Braslawsky, 951 F.2d
149 (7th Cir. 1991).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Marsh, 932 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Domincio, 765 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Va. 1991) (mem. and order).
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looked for guidance in the Federal Probation Act,"' which includes a
restitution provision similar to that of the VWPA. In United States v.
Soderling 3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, analyzing the rulings under
the Federal Probation Act (FPA) and the VWPA, held that decisions under the
VWPA should follow those of the FPA because the language of the statutes
was almost identical.2"4 Under the FPA (now repealed), a negotiated plea
agreement could order restitution beyond losses from the crimes for which the
defendant pleaded guilty.2" 5
The Fourth Circuit has ruled on this issue, stating that in cases involving
a plea agreement the court can consider the entire scheme for restitution
purposes, instead of just the acts to which the defendant pleaded guilty. In
United States v. Mullins"6 the defendant sought to pay restitution only for
the one act of wire fraud to which he pleaded guilty. The court held that the
defendant was liable for additional amounts of restitution, however, based on
the terms of the defendant's plea agreement.21 7
Revisions to the VWPA were needed, especially in the area of plea
agreements. The former practice of limiting the restitution amount to the
count of conviction, even in the presence of a plea agreement that increases
the restitution amount, would seem to be a hindrance to the resolution of
criminal cases. Many more cases can be resolved by way of plea agreements
if the defendant has more of a bargaining tool with the restitution amount.
However, courts should be cautious not to use restitution as a substitute for
incarceration. A wealthy defendant should not be permitted to plead himself
out of serving time in prison simply by paying increased restitution in return
for a dismissal of charges.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
213. 970 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2446 (1993).
214. Id. at 532-33.
215. Id. at 532.
216. 971 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1992).
217. 1d. at 1146 n.7. The court explained,
[Defendant] has contended that the specific conduct that is the basis of his offense of
conviction is only the wire fraud. ...
That argument is resolved by our conclusion that, based on the plea agreement
and the information, we must view the offense of conviction as . . . the entire
scheme to defraud . . . . Therefore, the amount of restitution may be based on the
losses suffered. . . from the scheme to defraud. ...
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ii. "Scheme or Conspiracy"
In United States v. Bane21s the court, recognizing that the federal circuits
had reached differing results in applying Hughey to offenses involving a
criminal scheme,219 followed the Fourth Circuit in holding that when the
offense of conviction involves a scheme to defraud the entire scheme should
be considered "conduct" under Hughey.'
In United States v. Stouffer?1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also
narrowed Hughey by holding that the defendants' convictions of wire and mail
fraud made them liable for restitution for all activities within their scheme to
defraud.22 The court noted that to convict the defendants of mail and wire
fraud the government had to prove a scheme to defraud.' Because a
fraudulent scheme is a necessary element of these offenses, the court
concluded that acts involved in the scheme were "conduct underlying the
offense of conviction" for Hughey purposes.' The court explained, "[Tihe
indictment described in detail the duration of Stouffer and Atchley's scheme
and the methods used-we find that the district court's inclusion of all losses
caused by the scheme to defraud satisfied Hughey's requirement that
sentencing courts focus upon only the specific conduct underlying the offense
of conviction."'
In an attempt to compensate more victims and narrow Hughey, Congress
amended the VWPA to include as victims those persons harmed by defendants
involved in a scheme or conspiracy. 6  The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals applied this change in the VWPA in United States v. Brothers"7 when
it upheld an order for the defendant, convicted of mail fraud, to pay restitution
for the losses caused by the entire fraudulent scheme and not merely for the
218. 817 F. Supp. 32 (N.D.W. Va. 1993) (order).
219. Id. at 33-34.
220. Id. at 34. The court stated,
In the instant matter, defendant plead guilty to mail fraud, an essential element of
which involves a scheme to defraud. Restitution imposed for the loss of all victims
in this matter is appropriate because the conduct which is the basis of conviction, and
to which defendant plead guilty, involves a scheme to defraud.
Id. (citation omitted).
221. 986 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1993).
222. Id. at 928-29.
223. Id. at 928.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 929.
226. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. Section 3663(a)(2) provides, "For the
purposes of restitution, a victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy,
or a pattern of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (Supp. V
1993).
227. 955 F.2d 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 142 (1992).
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losses caused by the specific acts of fraud proven by the government at
trial.
In United States v. All Star Industries 9 the Fifth Circuit took the
conspiracy theme a step further. A corporate defendant was ordered to pay
restitution under the Federal Probation Act 30 for acts that occurred more
than five years before the issuance of an indictment against it, despite a five-
year statute of limitations on the offenses."81 The court held that the
corporation, which had been convicted of participating in a single and
continuing conspiracy that began more than five years before the indictment
was returned but did not end until it was within the statute of limitations
period, could be ordered to pay restitution for all losses stemming from the
conspiracy. 2
It seems more appropriate and equitable to allow restitution only for
conduct underlying the offense of conviction, i.e., for the acts to which the
defendant has pleaded or is found guilty. This principle also would hold true
in cases involving a scheme or conspiracy; for restitution purposes, the court
should look only to the acts to which the defendant has pleaded or is found
guilty. The victim can seek restitution in a civil proceeding for those acts for
which the defendant was not deemed guilty at the criminal trial. This
requirement promotes the criminal nature of the restitution award and advances
the notion that restitution is a part of the criminal process, in that restitution
is awarded only for those acts for which the defendant is convicted or pleads
guilty.
4. Retroactivity of Hughey
In United States v. Guardinoe3 the court applied Hughey retroactively
to the defendant's obligation to pay restitution for offenses beyond those for
which he was convicted.8 The defendant was indicted on nineteen counts
of obtaining money fraudulently through his capacity as a professional psychic.
The defendant pleaded guilty to some counts; however, other counts were
dismissed.8 5 The defendant's sentencing occurred after the Hughey decision
but before the amendments regarding victims of schemes and conspiracies.2 6
228. Id. at 497.
229. 962 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
230. 18 U.S.C. § 3651, repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
231. All Star Industries, 962 F.2d at 476.
232. Id. at 477.
233. 972 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1992).
234. Id. at 687-88 n.7.
235. Id. at 684.
236. Id. at 687.
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The court held that the VWPA (prior to the 1990 amendment) permitted
restitution only for those acts for which the defendant was convicted.3 7
In United States v. Woods," however, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals declined to apply Hughey retroactively. 9 The defendant sought to
invoke Hughey's limited restitution interpretation while trying to recoup
restitution he paid pursuant to the Federal Probation Act before Hughey took
effect.2" The defendant relied upon Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which authorized courts to change illegal sentences at any
time.241 The court found that the rule did not directly address the retroactiv-
ity issue.242 In deciding not to give retroactive application to Hughey, the
court looked to the relief sought by the defendant. Had the defendant been
seeking his freedom or had the laws under which he was convicted been found
illegal, the court probably would have followed the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. United States43 and applied Hughey retroactive-
ly. 2" However, because the defendant was seeking only the return of his
money, the court found that the defendant's interest was not strong enough to
warrant a retroactive application of the new law.245
The idea of amending a restitution order through a retroactive application
of Hughey seems extreme. Retroactivity should be applied sparingly, as it is
such a drastic measure and may cause uncertainty and confusion. Recoupment
of restitution does not seem to be a sufficiently important interest to invoke a
237. Id. at 688. Quoting from a Seventh Circuit opinion, the court stated,
Even if [defendant] had entered into an agreement to pay a specific sum in restitution
beyond the damages from the crime of conviction, the district court lacked the
authority to issue a restitution order in that amount. Section 3663 and Hughey clearly
limit the amount of restitution which can be ordered.
Guardino, 972 F.2d at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Braslawsky, 951 F.2d
149 (7th Cir. 1992)).
238. 986 F.2d 669 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 90 (1993).
239. Id. at 682.
240. Id. at 673-74.
241. Id. at 674; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (amended by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II,
§ 215(b), 98 Stat. 2015 (1984)).
242. Woods, 986 F.2d at 675.
243. 417 U.S. 333 (1974). The test employed in Davis was "whether the claimed error of
law was a 'fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and
whether '(i)t .... present(s) exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded'
by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent." Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
244. Woods, 986 F.2d at 680-81.
245. Id.
We are more willing to expend scarce judicial resources-which, of course, is what
retroactivity entails-on those defendants that come before us because of an ongoing
or potential loss of liberty, than on those who, like Woods, seek the retroactive




Gaines: The Newly Adopted Criminal Restitution Statutes of South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
retroactive treatment of Hughey's holding.246 Because safeguards were in
place at the time of sentencing to make certain the defendant would be able to
pay the restitution, upholding the restitution amount would not seem to create
any considerable injustice to the defendant.
B. State Court Interpretations
State courts typically have interpreted the scope of their own state
restitution statutes to provide that restitution is available only for the act of
conviction and not for unrelated acts for which the defendant was charged but
not convicted.
In 1986 a California court of appeals held that the scope of restitution was
limited solely to the offense for which the defendant was convicted and to acts
"committed with the same state of mind as the offense of which he was
convicted."247 In California v. Lafantasie248 the defendant pleaded guilty
to unlawfully leaving the scene of an injury accident; however, he was never
charged with being criminally responsible for the accident.249 The trial court
ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the victim whom he struck.250
The appellate court vacated the restitution order, reasoning that the conduct for
which the defendant was found guilty, leaving the scene of an accident, bore
no relationship to paying the victim for injuries received.Y'1
The facts in Lafantasie clearly show the lack of a nexus between the
offense of conviction and the other acts for which the defendant was not
charged. Even a broad interpretation of the restitution statute could not sustain
a restitution order for the other acts because the other acts did not relate to the
crime for which the defendant was convicted, nor would a restitution order
based on those counts have served any rehabilitative goal. 2
246. See id. at 680-81.
247. 224 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 15.
250. Id. at 14.
251. Id. at 16-17. In holding that restitution was improper in this context, the court stated,
Requiring restitution for the act of driving at the time of the incident requires
restitution for an act which (1) has no relationship to the crime of which Lafantasie
was convicted, leaving the scene of an injury accident, (2) relates to conduct, driving,
which is not itself criminal and (3) requires conduct which is not reasonably related
to future criminality.
Lafantasie, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (citing California v. Lent, Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (1975) (en banc)).
252. Id. at 15. The court added that "[w]hile California law does not limit restitution to the
actual losses caused by the crime proved '. . . courts must tread lightly in this area lest they be
reduced to "mere collection agencies" [citations], and restitution must in each case be narrowly
tailored to serve a purpose described in section 1203.1.'" Id. (quoting California v. Richards,
131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1976) (en bane)).
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The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in 1988 employed the same
rationale in Brothers v. AlabamaZ3 when it held that a defendant who
pleaded guilty to burglary and theft of property but had an arson charge
against him dismissed could not be forced to make restitution for damages
caused by the arson. 4  The Brothers court observed that the criminal
activity for which the defendant was convicted (theft) bore no relationship to
that for which restitution was being sought (arson).5 5 Although the defen-
dant was charged with arson, he was not convicted of that offense. 6
V. SCOPE OF RESTITUTION AWARD UNDER REVISED VWPA
A. Compensable Expenses
The expansion of the VWPA's scope did not mean that the list of
compensable expenses would be extended. For example, in United States v.
Husk?7 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend the scope
of the VWPA to include restitution for the mental anguish and suffering of the
victim.25
s
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Keith29 also stated that the list of
compensable injuries provided in section 3663(b)(2) was exclusive. The court
noted, "Unlike an award of damages in a civil action, a restitution order under
the Act may compensate only for the kinds of harms enumerated in subsection
3579(b) [currently 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(b)]... and does not bar a
subsequent civil action for damages based upon the same incident. "2tu
Some courts have held that the VWPA does not authorize the inclusion
of consequential damages such as attorney's fees and expenses as a part of a
restitution order.26 Other courts have ordered the payment of consequential
damages, such as litigation costs and funeral expenses. In 1992, the Court of
253. 531 So. 2d 317 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
254. Id. at 318-19.
255. Id. at 319.
256. Id. at 318. The court noted that "[t]he appellant did not admit committing arson, nor
was he convicted of committing arson ... . The burning of the victim's house was not an
indirect result of the theft or burglary . . . ." Id. at 319.
257. 924 F.2d 223 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991).
258. Id. at 226-27. The court concluded that the list of compensable injurids provided in 18
U.S.C. § 3663(b)(2) is exclusive; thus, it determined that a court may not order restitution for
injuries outside the statutory list, such as mental anguish and suffering. Husky, 924 F.2d at 226-
27.
259. 754 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985).
260. Id. at 1391.
261. See United States v. Diamond, 969 F.2d 961, 968 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Arvanitis, 902 F.2d 489, 497 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[L]egal fees generated in prosecuting a claim are
not recoverable under the VWPA.").
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Criminal Appeals of Alabama in Butler v. Alabama262 addressed the scope
of damages available under the state restitution statute. The court used the
"reasonable person" standard of foreseeability of damages in determining the
appropriate amount of restitution. Applying this standard, the court deter-
mined that the criminal defendant was liable for costs of litigation involving
the deceased victim's will and for costs relating to the administration of the
victim's estate including funeral expenses.263
All expenses that occur as a natural and direct consequence of the
defendant's acts should be compensable. Therefore, restitution orders should
include all actual expenses that can be traced back to the defendant's criminal
conduct. The list of compensable losses under the VWPA should be expanded
to include any actual expenses incurred by the victim that were a direct and
foreseeable result of the defendant's criminal behavior. Punitive damages,
however, still should be left solely to the civil courts.
B. Factual Findings in Absence of Plea Agreement
When the government and the defendant enter a plea agreement that sets
the amount of restitution, a hearing on the amount of restitution ordered is not
necessary.' In the absence of a plea agreement, however, courts have
reached different conclusions on whether factual findings must be made when
setting the restitution amount.
The Ninth Circuit has stated that the restitution award must "have a sound
basis in fact" and that the victim should be allowed to participate in the fact
finding so that the court can make an accurate determination of the victim's
262. 608 So. 2d 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
263. Id. at 775-76. In this case, a nurse prompted her charge to change her will and to leave
her property to the nurse. A week later, the nurse murdered her victim. Id. at 774. The court
stated,
The criminal act, i.e., the murder of the victim, under the circumstances of this case,
was the proximate cause of the expenses, damages, or economic loss of the victims
who were, in this case, the heirs of the victim. The restitution was to cover each
heir's actual expenses and share of the economic loss that resulted from the murder.
We believe that a reasonable person could have foreseen or anticipated that the
expenses embodied in the restitution order might occur as a natural consequence of
the actions of the appellant, i.e., persuading the victim to change her will so as to
leave all her property to the appellant and murdering her in order to obtain the
property under the will. Under the circumstances existing here, it was reasonably
foreseeable that there would be litigation over the will with resulting costs and that
costs would be incurred in the administration of the victim's estate, including funeral
expenses.
Id. at 775-76.
264. See United States v. Kirkland, 853 F.2d 1243, 1249 n.10 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
United States v. Whitney, 838 F.2d 404, 404 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (stating that a plea
agreement fixes the responsibility for the loss with "reasonable certainty").
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losses.2" Conversely, in United States v. Hairston2" the Eleventh Circuit
held that no findings of fact need be made before ordering restitution.
267
It seems more consistent with the goal of fully compensating the victim
to make findings of fact when computing the restitution award. The basic goal
of restitution generally is to put the aggrieved party back in the same position
he or she would have been in had the specific event not occurred.. To rely on
vague factors in determining the restitution amount seems to be detrimental not
only to the defendant as the amount may be set too high but also to the victim
as he or she may not be fully compensated.
C. Limitation of Restitution Period
In United States v. Diamond2 6 the court considered how long the
period extends during which restitution can be ordered. The defendant
pleaded guilty to two counts of filing false reports with intent to defraud a
federal agency, the Small Business Association. He was sentenced to
probation and ordered to pay restitution to the SBA. 269 However, the court,
relying on the fact that restitution is a part of the sentencing process, held that
the requirement to pay restitution could not extend beyond the period of
probation given to the defendant.270
The holding in Diamond appears to be the majority position. Because
restitution is considered a part of the defendant's sentence, payment of
restitution should not be enforced beyond the time the defendant is serving his
or her sentence, either through incarceration or probation.
265. United States v. Weir, 861 F.2d 542, 546 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
266. 888 F.2d 1349 (11th Cir. 1989).
267. Id. at 1352. The court stated,
We agree with the courts that have declined to adopt a rigid rule requiring district
courts to make findings of fact whenever they impose an order of restitution under
the VWPA. The plain language of §§ 3579(a) and 3580(d) required only that the
district court "consider" the listed factors and resolve disputes by a preponderance
of the evidence. There was no requirement that specific findings be made on each
factor.
Id.
268. 969 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1992).
269. Id. at 963.
270. Id. at 969. The court observed, "Although a court may require a defendant to make
restitution under the VWPA 'within a specified period or in specified installments,' 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(f)(1) (1988), the duration of such period or the last such installment 'shall not be later
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D. Collateral Source Doctrine
In Varner v. Alabama271 the defendant was convicted of murder.
272
Although the defendant pointed out that the victim's funeral expenses might
have been paid by insurance, the court nevertheless held that the defendant
was liable for those expenses. The court recognized that "[u]nder the
collateral source doctrine, damages recovered by a party are not diminished
because the injured party has been compensated for the loss by insurance or
other such payment."273 As such, a victim does not have to prove that he
or she actually paid the expenses upon which the restitution amount is based.
Rather, the victim need only prove that he or she was liable for their
payment.274
In Butler v. Alabama75 the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the defendant could not offset the restitution award by any money paid to
the victims by third parties that overlapped the expenses for which the
defendant was liable.276
In cases involving multiple defendants, and absent any statutory directive
on the issue, courts have fashioned various methods to determine how
restitution should be made. Courts may apportion restitution based on the
relative culpability of each defendant, 277 divide the restitution amount equally
by the number of defendants,278 hold each defendant jointly and severally
liable to the victim, 279 or require each defendant to make full restitution to
the victim.
20
Not enough cases have been decided on this issue to determine a clear and
fast rule. Priority should be placed on requiring the criminal defendant to pay
the victim for the losses and damages the defendant caused without allowing
the victim to obtain a windfall by receiving full payment from each defendant.
Joint and several liability seems to be the best option, as each defendant
remains liable to the victim until the victim receives full compensation.
271. 497 So. 2d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
272. Id. at 1136.
273. Id. at 1139 (citing Mitchell v. Moore, 406 So. 2d 347, 351 (Ala. 1981)).
274. Id. at 1139 (citing Roland v. Krazy Glue, Inc., 342 So. 2d 383, 385 (Ala. Civ. App.
1977)).
275. 608 So. 2d 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
276. Id. at 776.
277. See Slavin & Sorin, supra note 14, at 527.
278. Id. at 528 (citing State ex rel D.G.W., 361 A.2d 513, 523-24 (N.J. 1976)). The authors
state that this view is an exception to the general rule. Id.
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E. Ex Post Facto Considerations
Some courts have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) to allow victims to
recover for criminal acts committed even before the enactment of the
legislation so long as one criminal act within the same "scheme or conspiracy"
occurred after the effective date. 281
Courts have ruled that if a defendant is tried after the effective date of
section 3663 for a crime committed before the effective dates and then is
ordered to pay restitution pursuant to that section, there is no violation of the
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws.' In United States v. Ar-
nold3 the Fifth Circuit ruled that no ex post facto violation occurred when
restitution was ordered under section 3663(a)(3),18 which became effective
after the commission of the crime but before the defendant's guilty plea.'
Ex post facto issues also were presented by a challenge to a restitution
award brought by the defendant in United States v. Wallen. 6 The Wallen
court held that the defendant, who had been convicted of racketeering, could
be ordered as a part of his sentence to pay restitution for all losses resulting
from his continuing offense, even for those losses suffered before the effective
date of the VWPA.3
However, in United States v. Streebinge' the Sixth Circuit held that 18
U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) could not be applied retroactively as it would violate the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.2 89 Although the statute
was in effect at the time of the defendant's conviction and sentencing, the
statute was not in effect at the time the crimes were committed for which
increased restitution was sought.2"
Circuits are split over the effect of ex post facto considerations in cases
in which the VWPA amendment expanding the list of compensable injuries
became effective after the commission of the defendant's crime but before the
defendant was convicted or pleaded guilty.29 Caution should be exercised
281. United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 42 (2d Cir. 1989).
282. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1.
283. 947 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993) (permitting sentencingjudge to order restitution
to extent provided in plea agreement).
285. Arnold, 947 P.2d at 1238 n.2.
286. 953 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
287. Id. at 4-5.
288. 987 F.2d 368 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2933 (1993).
289. Id. at 376.
290. Id.
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when retroactively applying a law that criminalizes actions that were not illegal
when the acts were committed.
PART Two
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
CRIMINAL RESTITUTION STATUTE
On June 10, 1993, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a piece
of legislation29 that was long overdue. The law provides the victims of
criminal acts an avenue to enforce the recovery of restitution from their
offenders. The general provisions of the legislation are located in section 17-
25-322(A) of the South Carolina Code.2" This section provides that a
hearing must be held to determine the appropriate restitution amount for
pecuniary damages the crime victim has suffered, unless the defendant in open
court agrees to the restitution amount.29
But just how far-reaching are South Carolina's restitution provisions? Are
they only applicable to felonies tried in circuit court or is any court with
criminal jurisdiction required to abide by their dictates? The statutes are
unclear on this issue.
The language of section 17-25-322(A) is almost identical to that of the
comparable Alabama criminal restitution section.295 As in the Alabama
statute, there is no expression concerning which courts have jurisdiction to
order restitution. Because the South Carolina statute does not limit to any
particular court the authority to impose restitution, any court that handles
criminal proceedings is subject to this section and must conduct a restitution
hearing as a matter of course.296
Sections 17-25-322, -323, and -326 do not differentiate as to the type of
criminal defendants that fall within their jurisdiction. 297 All of the sections
except Section 17-25-325 contain only general references to the type of crime
and court addressed.
292. 1993 S.C. Acts 140, §§ 1-4 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-25-322 to -326 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993)).
293. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
294. Id.
295. ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (1982).
296. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
297. Section 17-25-322(A) provides in general terms, "When a defendant is convicted of a
crime which has resulted in pecuniary damages or loss to a victim, the court must hold a hearing
to determine the amount of restitution due the victim or victims of
the defendant's criminal acts." Id.
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Section 17-25-325 raises the question of whether restitution applies only
to felonies, as it refers only to the court of general sessions in describing how
a victim may enforce a restitution order. 98 At best, section 17-25-325
confers specific powers to the court of general sessions not conferred by any
other section. At worst, it confuses the question of which courts are covered
by the restitution statutes. This ambiguity could be used by criminal
defendants, as it was by the defendant in Burt v. City of Montgomery,2 9 to
argue that the restitution statutes apply only to felonies under the jurisdiction
of the general sessions court.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has yet to decide a case involving the
new restitution statutes. However, the court decided cases before the
enactment of the enforcement statutes that challenged the constitutionality of
restitution awards.
I. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The main import of the restitution statutes is to make the victim whole.
However, the criminal defendant's ability to pay also is considered in
determining the appropriate amount of restitution and the appropriate
punishment for a failure to pay.3"u
The language of the South Carolina statute is comparable to that found in
the federal VWPA and the Alabama state statute insofar as each statute
provides that a number of factors must be considered in ordering restitu-
tion." Specifically, the South Carolina statute provides for the consider-
ation of the defendant's financial status before the presiding judge imposes
restitution.3m0
298. Section 17-25-325 states in relevant part:
The sentence and judgment of the court of general sessions in a criminal case against
an individual may be enforced in the same manner by execution against the property
of the defendant as is provided by law for enforcing the judgments of the courts of
common pleas in civil actions.
Id.
299. 598 So. 2d 5 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
300. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
301. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. V 1993); ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (1982).
302. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Section 17-25-322(B)
provides, in part,
In determining the manner, method, or amount of restitution to be ordered, the court
may take into consideration the following:
(1) The financial resources of the defendant and the victim and the burden that
the manner or method of restitution will impose upon the victim or the defendant;
(2) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(3) The anticipated rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner
of restitution or the method of payment; ....
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Full compensation seems to be contemplated by the South Carolina
statute.3 3 The trial court retains jurisdiction over the matter until restitution
is paid in full. 4 If a probation or parole defendant is found in default on
the restitution award, judgment will be entered in favor of the State or victim
for any unpaid balance or fines.30 5
The South Carolina restitution statute addresses the issue of indigent
defendants in section 17-25-322(B). 3 6 The Code section requires the judge
to consider the ability of the defendant to pay before issuing a restitution
order. 7 This section of the South Carolina Code is similar in wording to
section 3664 of the VWPA and reads identically to the corresponding Alabama
Code section upon which it was modeled."' Additionally, the South
Carolina Code provides for a hearing to show cause when the defendant is in
default.3"9 Revocation of a defendant's probation is not automatic; indigence
is one factor that the South Carolina courts may consider before deciding
whether a criminal defendant's probation should be revoked.310
303. For instance, section 17-25-322(A) provides, "Mhe court shall order the defendant
make restitution or otherwise compensate the victim for any pecuniary damages." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-25-322(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. Id. § 17-25-323(B).
306. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
307. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(B)(1)-(3) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1993). This section
provides that:
In determining the manner, method, or amount of restitution to be ordered, the court
may take into consideration the following:
(1) The financial resources of the defendant and the victim and the burden that
the manner or method of restitution will impose upon the victim or the defendant;
(2) The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(3) The anticipated rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner
or the method of payment; ....
308. ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (1982).
309. Section 17-25-323(B) provides, in pertinent part:
When a defendant has been placed on probation ... and ordered to make restitution,
and the defendant is in default in the payment of them or of any installment. . . , the
court, before the defendant completes his period of probation or parole, on motion
of the victim or the victim's legal representative, the solicitor, or a probation and
parole agent, or upon its own motion, must hold a hearing to require the defendant
to show cause why his default should not be treated as a civil judgment and a
judgment lien attached.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-323(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
310. See id.; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(g) (Supp. V 1993) ("In determining whether to revoke
probation ... the court shall consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability,
financial resources, the willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay, and any other special
circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to pay.").
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In 1986 the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Barlet v. State, 1'
a criminal case dealing with the failure of the defendant to make restitution.
The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of grand larceny and was sentenced
to probation and ordered to pay fees and restitution to the victim. His
probation was revoked for failure to make the required payments.31 2 The
supreme court reversed the decision to revoke the defendant's probation,
holding that probation could not be revoked solely for a failure to pay
restitution absent a showing that the defendant failed to make a bona fide
effort.
313
Several years after Barlet, the supreme court decided Nichols v.
State. 4 In Nichols the state successfully sought to revoke the defendant's
probation for his nonpayment of the ordered restitution.
315
On appeal, the supreme court again held that probation could not be
revoked for a failure to pay restitution without a showing that the defendant
did not make a bona fide effort to pay. Because such a showing had not been
made at the revocation hearing, the court determined that the defendant's due
process rights had been violated. 6
Even though Barlet and Nichols were decided before the enactment of the
South Carolina restitution statutes, they followed the principles established by
courts in other states with criminal restitution statutes similar to South
Carolina's VWPA. The holdings of these two cases thus follow the dictates
of South Carolina's newly adopted restitution statutes.
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Another case decided before the adoption of the new restitution statutes
was Fanning v. Hicks.317 Fanning involved a civil cause of action brought
by a burglary victim against a criminal defendant. The defendant appealed the
judgment of actual and punitive damages on the theory that the criminal
restitution award acted as an accord and satisfaction. Although the defendant
was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in the criminal proceeding, the
Fanning court held that the defendant was liable to the victim for civil
damages, as well, because the restitution ordered in the criminal proceeding
was not agreed to by the victim.'
311. 288 S.C. 481, 343 S.E.2d 620 (1986).
312. Id. at 481-82, 343 S.E.2d at 621.
313. Id. at 483, 343 S.E.2d at 622.
314. 308 S.C. 334, 417 S.E.2d 860 (1992).
315. Id. at 336, 417 S.E.2d at 861.
316. Id. at 337, 417 S.E.2d at 862. The Nichols court also held that the defendantwas denied
effective assistance of counsel at the probation revocation hearing, as his attorney failed to make
a showing of the defendant's inability to pay restitution. Id.
317. 284 S.C. 456, 327 S.E.2d 342 (1985).
318. Id. at 458, 327 S.E.2d at 343. In so holding, the court stated,
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Although Fanning was a civil suit and decided under the laws of accord
and satisfaction, it did address the issue of restitution at criminal proceedings.
Because the case was decided before the enactment of the new restitution
statutes, the victim in Fanning had no voice in the amount of the restitution
award.
Collateral estoppel issues, although not addressed by the court, are present
in Fanning. The court awarded restitution to the victim in the criminal
proceeding. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that restitution amount
should have been offset from any recovery in the civil proceeding. Had
Fanning been decided under the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA
or corresponding state provisions, Hicks would have been entitled to an offset
of the amount Fanning recovered in criminal restitution.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The legislature has provided a framework within which victims can
enforce the recovery of criminal restitution. However, as is evident from the
analysis of the newly adopted criminal restitution statute in this state, many
revisions are necessary to avoid the pitfalls of the VWPA and other state
statutes. This state's legislature wanted to ensure a way for the victims of
criminal acts to receive compensation from their offenders31 9 by enacting
into law the restitution statute. Unfortunately, the legislature fell into the same
drafting quagmire that afflicted the federal and various state governments. The
legislative intent is clear; however, the law has been and will be challenged on
many fronts unless some necessary amendments to the statutes are made.
The South Carolina criminal restitution statute contains no definitions
section. Therefore, problems likely will present themselves when courts
attempt to determine the precise meaning of such terms as "victim," "criminal
acts," or "restitution" amount. The state legislature should adopt a complete
and concise definitional section to the restitution statute so that there will be
no doubt as to what persons, criminal acts, or courts come within the purview
of the statute. Restitution should be awarded for any losses that can be
directly attributable to the actions of the defendant and for which there is a
reasonable foreseeability or likelihood. The aim of restitution should be to put
the victim in the financial position he would have been in but for the crimes
of the defendant. Although no punitive damages should be awarded, the list
The record is void of any evidence that Fanning agreed with Hicks to settle their
dispute for $3,850. Restitution was ordered by the court as a special condition to
probation. Respondent was not even present during the taking of the plea. Without
an agreement between the parties, there can be no accord and satisfaction.
Id.
319. JUDICIARY COMM. REPORT, supra note 4.
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of compensable expenses should be expanded further than that of the VWPA
to be in line with the holding of the Alabama court in Butler v. Alabama.
320
Whether restitution is a criminal or a civil penalty needs to be explained.
This can be implemented through the definitional section. The inclusion of
this provision would clear up the ambiguity of the enforcement provisions of
the statutes, equating it to the enforcement of civil judgments.
Amendments also should be made to provide collateral estoppel and res
judicata treatment for the acts underlying the offenses on which conviction is
predicated.321 Such a revision would be helpful to the victim in any subse-
quent civil proceeding, as he or she would not have to prove the defendant's
guilt again. It also would be equitable to the defendant, as any civil award
would be offset by the amount the defendant paid the victim in criminal
restitution. It would cut down on court time and expense, as well.
Finally, the legislature should specify the courts to which the restitution
statutes apply. On this issue, the legislature should follow the lead of the
VWPA and amend the statute to include all criminal courts.
Plea agreements and their effects on the restitution amount also need to
be addressed. The legislature should follow the VWPA's lead and allow for
restitution beyond the count of conviction so long as the defendant agrees.3z2
The victim would be likely to be awarded an even greater restitution amount.
Finally, the statutes need to be amended to address recovery by the victim
of the restitution amount from a third party or from multiple defendants.
Since one of the goals of restitution is to rehabilitate the defendant, a priority
should be placed on the defendant's repaying the victim, even if there has been
payment to the victim by a third party. When multiple defendants are
involved, they should be held jointly and severally liable to the victim until the
full restitution amount is paid.
CONCLUSION
The main thrust of this Article is that most of the problems encountered
on the federal and various state levels concerning criminal restitution statutes
can be avoided in South Carolina. The current South Carolina statute needs
certain changes, discussed earlier, that should be instituted as soon as possible,
to avoid costly litigation of issues that could be resolved simply through better
drafting. The South Carolina General Assembly, by adopting the criminal
restitution statute, began addressing the needs of the victims of crimes. This
subject is especially important now when the increase in criminal activity has
brought the issue of the rights of crime victims to the forefront. However,
320. 608 So. 2d 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
321. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1988).
322. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (Supp. 1990).
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better drafting of the criminal restitution statute is necessary to ensure that
crime victims in this state are not engulfed in a morass of poorly written laws
when they seek restitution for their losses.
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